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The recent debates and reorientation of immigration policies of EU Member States towards 
the more active international recruitment of highly skilled immigrants and their more 
successful integration in the host countries (including through naturalisation) have given rise 
to concerns over a renewed brain drain. In the meantime, migrants’ remittances – an 
important source of capital for developing countries and one of the main compensation 
mechanisms of brain drain – draw the attention of policy makers and scholars because of the 
dramatic increase of their international flows (Straubhaar and Vadean, 2006). This paper aims 
to be a contribution to the discussion about how naturalisation affects the remittance 
behaviour of households and what instruments migrant source and receiving countries could 
employ to foster remittance flows. 
 
The literature on the remittance behaviour of households is substantial. In the 1970’s Becker 
first argued that remittances represented a benevolent act which promoted well-being and 
equality across the extended family. Later, Lucas and Stark (1985) more broadly addressed 
the range of immigrant transfer motives and argued that remittances can be motivated by pure 
altruism, pure self-interest (i.e. chance of an inheritance or investment in assets at home, 
especially when the immigrant intends to return to his/her home country) or something in 
between which they called tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest (i.e. that 
remittances can be a result of a co-insurance or loan agreement between family members). 
 
In the 1990’s Glytsos (1997) highlighted the importance of the immigrant’s return intentions 
in determining remittance behaviour by documenting that temporary migrants remit more 
than permanent ones. Shamsuddin and DeVoretz (1998) noted the substitute relation between 
remittances and investment savings (e.g. home ownership). 
                                                 
∗ Support from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, the Migration Research Group/HWWI and the Asia 
Research Institute/NUS are noted with appreciation. This paper owes much to in-depth discussions on the 
topic with Don DeVoretz. Assistance from John P. Haisken-DeNew and Mathias Sinning for the extraction of 
data from the GSOEP and valuable comments from Katja Michaelowa and the University of Hamburg 
research seminar “Quantitative Economic Research” participants are gratefully acknowledged. 
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More recently, Semyonov and Gorodzeisky (2005) found gender differences in the remittance 
behaviour, with migrant-men sending more money than migrant-women to households in the 
Philippines, owing to greater male earnings. Finally, DeVoretz and Vadean (2006) with the 
aid of Canadian data, report ethnic group cultural differences in the remittance behaviour of 
households. Asian immigrant households in Canada are displaying significantly different 
remittance patterns compared to the other immigrant and Canadian households, due to the 
particularity that Asian households value more the ties to their extended family. 
 
Concerning the effects of naturalisation, in a recent study on the Diaspora activities of 
Afghans, Egyptians and Serbs in Germany, Bommes et al. (2006) show that trans-national 
activities (i.e. networks of reciprocity among family members and co-villagers, or business 
connections between the country of settlement and the homeland) are particularly affected by 
the residence and citizenship status of the migrants in the host country. Holding German 
temporary or permanent visa restricts sojourns in the home country to six months durations1. 
Acquiring German citizenship removes this impediment. However, it brings other obstacles 
in the home country commitment of migrants. In order to acquire German citizenship, those 
eligible must give-up their original citizenship. Under these circumstances these new German 
citizens may now require an entry visa for home visits or residence permits for long term 
stays, lose the right to buy or even own real property, and in the extreme they may experience 
discrimination in their erstwhile home country. Of course the best alternative to this outcome 
is dual-citizenship, status which provides rights in both the host and the home country. 
 
Germany’s foreign-born population in 2005 was of about 10.1 million immigrants (or 12.3% 
of its total population) and remitted a total estimated amount of US$14.6 billion outside 
Germany (Münz et al., 2006). Germany thus, being the second largest source country of 
international migrants’ remittances after the United States (US$43.5 billion). 
 
From Germany’s total foreign-born population about 3.4 million (or 34%) were naturalised in 
2005. The naturalisation rate in Germany is low compared to 84% in Canada, 75% in 
Australia, 56% in the United Kingdom, and 40% in the United States (Tran et al., 2005). 
However, it boosted after the changes to Germany’s citizenship law in 2000. While the 
average number of naturalisations for the period 1997 to 1999 was about 111,000/year, it rose 
to over 173,000/year for the years 2000 to 2002 (Oezcan, 2003). 
                                                 
1 Sojourns outside Germany for periods longer than six months lead to the expiration of the German residence 
permit. 




One of the main reasons for this rapid increase in naturalisations is the reduction of the 
required period of habitual residence in Germany prior to application from 15 to 8 years2. 
Moreover, children of foreign parents may acquire German citizenship by birth3. They must 
however decide between age 18 to 23 whether they want to retain their German nationality or 
the nationality of their parents (§ 29 StAG). 
 
Under the new German Nationality Act (StAG) dual-citizenship is still not recognized. Those 
applying for naturalization must in principle give up their foreign nationality4. However, 
there are many exemptions from this rule, e.g. for elderly persons and victims of political 
persecution, if release from the foreign nationality is legally impossible or unacceptable due 
to high release fees or degrading methods of release, if the release from the foreign 
nationality would bring considerable disadvantages (i.e. economic disadvantages or problems 
related to property and assets). Furthermore, there are special facilities for retaining previous 
nationality for citizens of most EU countries5. 
 
This paper extends the current remittance literature by assessing the motivations of immigrant 
households to remit within the context of the German immigration and naturalisation policy. 
In short, the study is an attempt to find answers to the question: How does naturalisation 
affect the remittance behaviour of immigrant households? 
 
I shall start by outlining the theoretical model. Section 3 discusses the data and reports some 
descriptive statistics. Section 4 specifies the empirical model used to estimate the 
determinants of remittances. The results are presented in Section 5 and conclusions appear in 
the last section. 
                                                 
2 If a foreigner is married with a German citizen, the minimum residence period is only 3 years. Ethnic Germans 
shall obtain German citizenship immediately after resettlement in Germany (§ 7 StAG). 
3 If one parent is legally residing in Germany for at least 8 years or is a EU/EEA citizen legally residing in 
Germany (§ 4 StAG). 
4 German citizens lose their citizenship when they acquire another nationality. This measure aims to discourage 
foreigners from applying for their former citizenship after they had been naturalized in Germany (Oezcan, 
2003). 
5 These applies for citizens from Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Malta, 
Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, and the United Kingdom and certain population groups (e.g. 
spouses) in the case of the Netherlands and Slovenia. 





This section presents a utility maximization model which describes the conditions under 
which positive or null household remittances arise. I theorize that migrant household 
members derive utility ( mu ) from consumption of the migrant household ( mc ), consumption 
of those left home ( hc ), and the maintenance service ( hd ) the family members in the home 
country provide for the assets ( AmAS ; e.g. real estate, cattle, business) which the migrant 
household holds in the home country (A): 
( ) ( ) ( )],,,,,[ mAmhmhhmmmm RASdkRYcnRYcuu +−=      (1.1) 
where ( mR ) are remittances to relatives and are assumed to be motivated by both altruism and 
self-interest (i.e. motivate relatives to take care of the assets held in the home country). 
 
Consumption (net of remittances) of the migrant household is assumed to increase as the total 
income of the migrant household ( mY ) increases and decrease with the amount of remittances 
( mR ): 0>∂∂ mm Yc  and 0<∂∂ mm Rc . Consumption may vary also with household size. 
However, the sign of ncm ∂∂  is unrestricted, depending on the presence of economies or 
diseconomies of scale in consumption6. 
 
Consumption of the household in the home country ( hc ) is further assumed to be positively 
dependent on the total income of the foreign based household ( hY ), the remittances received 
( mR ) and the family size (k): 0>∂∂ hh Yc  and 0>∂∂ mh Rc ; the sign of kch ∂∂  depends on 
the presence of economies or diseconomies of scale in consumption. 
 
The maintenance service the family members in the home country provide for the migrant 
household’s assets in the home country are assumed to be positively dependent on the amount 
of assets the migrant household owns in the home country ( AmAS ) and the remittances 
received ( mR ): 0>∂∂
A
mh ASd  and 0>∂∂ mh Rd . 
 
                                                 
6 See Lucas and Stark (1985). 
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Further, the amount of assets which the migrant household holds in the home country ( AmAS ) 
depends positively on the migrant’s total assets ( mAS ), the difference of the gross return to 
capital in the home and the host country ( BA GPKGPK − ) and negatively on the difference in 
transaction costs of holding assets in the home and host country respectively ( BA TT − ): 
( ) )](,,[ BABAmAm TTGPKGPKASASAS −−=      (1.2) 
The migrant household’s total assets are assumed, for simplicity, to be constant: 
constASm =
7. Hence, the migrant household transfers assets between home and host country 
on the basis of the difference in net return to assets between the two countries8. 
 
The transaction costs the migrant household must bear whilst owning assets in the host 
country are assumed, for simplicity, to be zero ( 0=BT ). In the meantime, the transaction 
costs to be borne for the assets own in the home country are determined by the immigrant’s 
residence status in the host country (B): 
( )BsA ITT =           (1.3) 
where s  denotes the migrant’s residence status in the host country, which can be: V  – 
temporary or permanent visa, C  – citizenship, or DC  – dual citizenship. 
 
Case I: Temporary or Permanent Visa (i.e. foreign citizenship) 
 
If the migrant household members hold a temporary or permanent visa of the host country 
(and implicitly the citizenship of the home country), the migrant household does not face 
restrictions on acquiring assets in its home country. However, transaction costs may be 
positive since the host country imposes limits on the periods of stay in the home country9: 
( ) 0>BVA IT . 
 























        (1.4) 
                                                 
7 In other words mRmCmY +=  or there are no savings and no borrowing. 
8 Implicitly this assumes no preference for holding assets neither in the home nor in the host country. 
9 According to the German Immigration Act, the resident permit expires if the immigrant leaves the German 
territory and does not return within a period of 6 months (see German Immigration Act § 51). 




Which states that the utility of the migrant’s household is maximised if the marginal utility 
from own consumption equals the marginal utility derived from the consumption of the 
relatives back home, while the marginal utility from own consumption is higher or equal to 
the marginal utility derived from maintenance service for the assets held in the home country. 
This equilibrium is determined by altruism, since the decision about the last Euro remitted is 





















∂          (1.5) 
Or, the utility of the migrant’s household is maximised if the marginal utility derived from 
own consumption equals the marginal utility derived from maintenance services, while the 
marginal utility from own consumption is greater or equal to the marginal utility derived from 
the consumption of goods by relatives back home. This equilibrium can be characterised by 
self-interest, since the decision about the last Euro remitted is based on the marginal utility 
obtained from services provided by the relatives. 
 
Case II: Citizenship of the Host Country (only) 
 
Choosing the host country’s citizenship and being compelled to renounce the home country’s 
citizenship may increase the transaction costs of holding assets in country A: 0>∂∂ →
B
CV
A IT . 
This is the case if, for example, in country A citizenship is required to own real property, 
country B’s nationals are required a visa for entry and stay in country A and/or emigrants that 










m IAS  or, if the transaction costs 
of holding assets in the country of origin rise due to the loss of the origin country’s 
citizenship, then the migrant household will reduce the amount of assets held there. By 
reducing the amount of these assets, their marginal utility from maintenance service will fall 
causing: hmmm ducu ∂∂>∂∂ . Now, if hmmm cucu ∂∂=∂∂  (1.4), remittances to relatives will 
be held constant, since altruistic motives for remittances dominate. However, if 
hmmm cucu ∂∂>∂∂  (1.5), remittances to relatives will be reduced until one of the equilibrium 
conditions (1.4 or 1.5) is be achieved. To conclude: 0≤∂∂ →
B
CVm IR . 
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Case III: Dual Citizenship 
 
Nevertheless, if the migrant household members have the possibility of holding dual 
citizenship, this will lower the transaction costs of holding assets in their country of birth, 
because all transnational activity obstacles are removed: 0<∂∂ →
B
DCV









m IAS  or, acquiring dual 
citizenship will motivate the migrant household to increase the amount of assets held in the 
country of origin, due to the decrease in transaction costs. By increasing the amount of assets 
held there, its marginal utility derived from maintenance service will rise. Moreover, if the 
marginal utility from maintenance service now exceeds the marginal utility from own 
consumption and implicitly also the marginal utility from the consumption of the relatives 
( hmmmhm cucudu ∂∂≥∂∂>∂∂ ), remittances to relatives will be increased in order to 
achieve the equilibrium condition (1.5). To conclude: 0≥∂∂ →
B
DCVm IR . 
 
Choosing a level of mR  to maximise (1.1) with respect to (1.2) and (1.3) provides
10: 
( )BsBAmhmm IGPKGPKASknYYRR ,,,,,, −=       (1.6) 
If the migrant household members care about the relatives in the home country and perceive 
them as trustworthy agents in managing and maintaining the assets held in the home country, 
and if  the migrants household utility function, the home family utility function and the 
maintenance service utility function are well behaved, six proprieties of the remittance to 
relatives function are predicted: 0>∂∂ mm YR , 0<∂∂ hm YR , 0>∂∂ mm ASR , 
( ) 0>−∂∂ BAm GPKGPKR , 0≤∂∂ →B CVm IR , and 0≥∂∂ →B DCVm IR . The signs of nRm ∂∂  and 
kRm ∂∂  are uncertain, depending on the presence of economies or diseconomies of scale in 
consumption. 
 
                                                 
10 Implicitly, this treats Ym and Yn as exogenous. In particular, the migrant household members are assumed 
neither to work harder nor to accept worse working conditions with higher pay in order to remit, and no moral 
hazard is involved in the sense of the home group’s reducing effort. 
ARI Working Paper No. 89 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore  
 
 10
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The data are drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)11 for the years 1996-
2005 which contain information on the citizenship and dual-citizenship status of the 
respondents12. The analysis concentrates on West Germany, since less than 2% of the migrant 
population in the sample lives in East Germany and is performed at the household level, since 
remittances are made from the household’s income and/or assets. The characteristics of the 
household head are introduced as socio-economic controls, assuming that the highest earner 
is the person who determines the household’s expenditure patterns (including remittances). 
 
The immigrant households 13  are divided into six groups: immigrants from countries 
belonging to the EU-15/EEA and Switzerland, immigrants from the twelve new EU Member 
States, immigrants from Turkey, immigrants from the Western Balkans, immigrants from the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and other immigrants 14 . The breakdown 
occurred on the basis of the different rights immigrants from these countries enjoy on the 
German labour market and the different entry, stay and property rights the naturalised 
foreign-born in Germany enjoy in their countries of origin. 
 
After excluding all observations with missing values for the variables included in the 
estimations, the unbalanced panel data set contains 9,155 household-year-observations of 
1,236 households. 
 
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics, in order to provide context. When looking at the 
descriptive statistics, first the heterogeneity among immigrant groups in terms of citizenship 
status is noted, most probably being a consequence of the German immigration and 
naturalisation policy. Immigrants of the first group enjoy full labour market access in 
Germany under the EU/EEA free movement of labour. It is therefore not surprising that only 
few of them have acquired German citizenship (4%), since they have no additional economic 
                                                 
11 The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v1.0 (Oct 2006) for Stata. 
PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@panelwhiz.eu). The following authors supplied 
PanelWhiz SOEP Plugins used to ensure longitudinal consistency, John P. Haisken-DeNew (3), Markus Hahn 
and John P. Haisken-DeNew (15), Mathias Sinning (11). The PanelWhiz generated DO file to retrieve the 
SOEP data used here and any Panelwhiz Plugins are available upon request. Any data or computational errors 
in this paper are my own. Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006) describes PanelWhiz in detail. 
12  Information on the dual-citizenship status is available for the years 2000-2005. However, we could 
extrapolate it for the years 1996-1999 by using the information on the year of receiving German citizenship. 
13 Household having as head a person that immigrated to Germany after 1948. 
14 The last immigrant group was excluded from the analysis since it was deemed too heterogeneous. 
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benefit from it. Furthermore, even if acquiring German citizenship (with or without giving up 
the citizenship of their country of origin)15, they hardly lose mobility or economic rights in 
their country of origin. Consequently, no effect of a change in the citizenship status on the 
remittance behaviour for immigrants in this group should be expected. 
 
Immigrants from the new EU Member States have a high naturalisation rate (87%). Most 
probably due to the fact that many repatriated ethnic Germans, having a privileged status for 
naturalisation in Germany, originate form these countries. Moreover, this immigrant group 
has the highest dual citizenship rate (22%), may be as a result of the recognition of dual 
citizenship by many East European countries. Although it is illegal in Germany and might 
have as a consequence the loss of the German citizenship, it is not uncommon that 
immigrants re-acquire, the citizenship of their country of origin after they have given it up to 
obtain German citizenship. Furthermore, the twelve new EU Member States made in the last 
ten years significant progress in order to access the EU, e.g. free mobility of persons and free 
mobility of capital (including liberalisation of real estate markets). Thus, little influence 
should be expected, if any, of changes in the citizenship status on the remittance behaviour of 
immigrants in this group too. 
 
The next two groups (i.e. immigrants from Turkey and the Western Balkans) have similar and 
pretty low naturalisation rates (15%). Most immigrants from these groups arrived in Germany 
at the beginning of the 1970s as guest-workers and did not return to their country of origin 
(even if over 60% of them express their intention to do so). However, due to the German 
restrictive immigration and naturalisation policy they also failed to integrate in the German 
society. 
 
Contrarily to Turkey, the countries in the Western Balkans had until recently visa 
requirements for German citizens. Moreover, as a consequence of the break-up of the 
Yugoslav Republic in the 1990s and the war that followed, many of the newly emerged 
countries restricted the access of foreigners to the acquisition of real property (especially land; 
Akin, 2006). Therefore, in particular for the immigrants from the Western Balkans, a change 
in the citizenship status should have a significant impact on the remittance activity. 
 
                                                 
15 Citizens of many EU countries do not have to give up the citizenship of their country of origin when taking up 
German citizenship (see Footnote 5). 
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Finally, immigrants from the CIS have the highest naturalisation rates (96%), due to the fact 
that most immigrants in this group are ethnic Germans. The CIS have restrictive immigration 
policies towards Germany (i.e. entry visa). However, the two main migrant source countries 
from the CIS opened-up their real estate markets towards foreign investments (Heidemann, 
2005). Hence, the citizenship effect on the remittance behaviour is uncertain. 
 
In terms of acts of remittance, Western Balkan immigrants are the most prone to remit with 
64% of them sending remittances at least in one year of panel, while EU-15/EEA immigrants 
are least active with only 23% of them sending remittances. However, from the remittance 
active households, EU-15/EEA immigrants remitted the highest average amounts (€946/year), 
while CIS immigrant households the lowest (€275/year). 
 
Table 2 presents the structure of remittance data for the sample drawn. The most households 
in the panel (61%) do not remit to persons outside their household. Furthermore, even when a 
household remits, only a few (4%) remit each year they appear in the panel. Thus, it seems 
that most households do not remit regularly but rather save over several years and then 




Given the fact that an unbalanced panel is used, non-randomly missing data may be a 
consequence of self-selection. For example, this occurs when households refuse to participate 
in a certain survey year or refuse to answer particular questions. In addition to non-response, 
households do leave the survey out of several reasons, e.g. refuse of participation in 
subsequent years, migration or death, causing attrition in the panel. 
 
Verbeek and Nijman (1992) proposed a simple test for sample selection in panel data models. 
For the random effects model, they suggest including three simple variables in the regression. 
These are: a) the number of waves the ith household appears in the panel, iT ; b) a dummy 






; and c) 1, −tis  indicating whether the household was present in the last wave. The null 
hypothesis says that these variables should not be significant in our model if there are no 
sample selection problems. Another test is a Hausman-type test and compares the fixed 
effects estimator from the balanced sample as opposed to the unbalanced sample. 
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The basic specification of the linear panel data model is: 
itiitit zxy εαβ +′+′=          (2.1) 
where ity  represents the log of remittances to persons abroad. itx  denotes the set of 
explanatory variables at time t that include characteristics of the household head (i.e. gender, 
age, education, number of relatives living abroad [differentiated as spouse and/or ex-spouse; 
sons, daughters, grandsons and/or daughters; parents, grandparents, parents in-law and/or 
grandparents in-law; brothers, sisters, brothers in-law and/or sister in-law; and other relatives], 
years since immigration to Germany, intention to return home, self-assessed attachment to the 
home country, and citizenship status [differentiated as foreign citizenship, German 
citizenship or dual citizenship]), characteristics of the household (i.e. number of adults [over 
age 16] in the household, number of children in the household [under age 16], house 
ownership, the log of net income, and the log of income from assets [as proxy for wealth]), 
the difference of the GDP growth rates between Germany and the home country, and the log 
of GDP per capita (PPP) in the home country (as a proxy for the income of the relatives)16. iz  
are unobserved household specific effects. 
 
The random effects (GLS/RE) model is based on the assumption that unobserved household 
specific effects are uncorrelated with the included variables itx . Therefore, any OLS or 
GLS/RE estimators of this model is inconsistent when it contains variables that are correlated 
with iz , i.e. are endogenous. For example, unobservable future inheritance might have strong 
effect on self-interest motivated remittances (Lucas and Stark, 1985) and the love and 
affection towards the relatives in the home country can affect the amount of altruistic 
remittances as well as the family reunification process in the host country and, thus, the 
immigrant household size and the number of relatives in the host country. 
 
However, the GLS/RE model allows the inclusion of time invariant regressors, such as 
demographic characteristics, while the fixed effects model does not. According to Green 
(2002), a model that overcomes the correlation between iz  and itx  while accommodating the 
inclusion of time invariant regressors is the Hausman and Taylor (HT/IV-GLS) estimator. 
This is an instrumental variable estimator that uses as instruments only the information within 
the original GLS/RE model: 
iitiiititit uzzxxy ++′+′+′+′= εααββ 22112211       (2.2) 
                                                 
16 Data on GDP growth rates and GDP per capita (PPP) are taken from the World Development Indicators 2005. 
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where iz1  and iz2  are both observed; the unobserved household effects are contained in the 
households specific random term iu ; itx1  are time variant regressors uncorrelated with iu ; iz1  
are time invariant regressors uncorrelated with iu ; itx2  are time variant regressors correlated 
with iu ; and iz2  are time invariant regressors correlated with iu . The assumptions about the 
random terms are: 
[ ] 0,| 11 =iiti zxuE  while [ ] 0,| 22 ≠iiti zxuE , [ ] 22211 ,,,| uiitiiti zxzxuVar σ= , 
[ ] 0,,,|, 2211 =iitiitiit zxzxuCov ε , [ ] 2222211 ,,,| uiitiitiit zxzxuVar σσσε ε +==+ , 
[ ] 222211 ,,,|, σσρεε uiitiitiisiit zxzxuuCorr ==++ . 
 
Following Gardner (1998) and Green (2002), in the unbalanced panel setting and after 
transformation, the model has the form: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) iiiiitiiiiiiitiiitiiit uzzxxxxyy θεθεθθβθβθθ ˆˆ1ˆˆ]ˆ1[]ˆ1[ˆ1 21222111 +−−+′+′+′−−′+′−−′=−−
 
( ) ( ) +′+′−+′+′−= 2222211111 ˆˆ βθββθβ iiiitiiiit xxxxxx  
( ) iiiiiitiiii uzz θεθεεθθ ˆˆˆˆ 21 ++−+′+′+      (2.3) 
with ( )′− iit xx 11 , ( )′− iit xx 22 , ix1′ , and iz1′  as instrumental variables. iθ̂  denotes the sample 
estimate of ( )222 uii Tσσσθ εε += . 
 
Because it removes from the model the part of the disturbance that is correlated with itx2 , 
2
εσ  
is consistently obtained from the estimation of the fixed effects, least squares dummy variable 
estimator (LSDV): 
( ) ( ) iitiitiitiit xxxxyy εεββ −+′−+′−=− 222111  ,    (2.4) 
while 2uσ  is obtained from the residual variance of the instrumental variable regression on iz1 , 
iz2  and iit εε −  (from the LSDV estimation) with instrumental variables iz1  and itx1 : 
iu T
222*
εσσσ += . From this estimator and with 
2
εσ  from the LSDV the estimator of 
iu T
22*2
εσσσ −= . 
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To take into account the censored nature of the dependent variable, we estimate also a panel 
tobit model: 
itiitit ezxy +′+′= αβ          (2.5) 
with [ ] 0,| =iitit zxeE , [ ] 2,| eiitit zxeVar σ=  and 
*
it
yyit =  if 0
* >
it
y  and         (2.6) 
0=ity  otherwise 
 
The conditional mean of an observation randomly drawn from the population, i.e. the 
expected value of remittances given the observable characteristics or the so called 
unconditional expectation, consists of the probability of remittances being uncensored and 
the expected value of positive remittances, i.e. the conditional expectation (Bauer and 
Sinning, 2005): 

















it xxx        (2.7) 
where ( ).φ  represents the standard normal density function and ( ).Φ  is the cumulative 
















xyE |         (2.8) 
for which McDonald and Moffitt (1980) propose a useful decomposition into two 
components: 































The first term on the right hand side represents the change in the expected remittances of the 
households making remittances, weighted by the probability of making a positive remittance, 
and the second term gives the change in the probability of positive remittances, weighted by 
the expected value of positive remittances. 
 
Like the GLS/RE model, the random-effects tobit model is based on the assumption that 
unobserved household specific effects are uncorrelated with the included variables itx . If the 
model includes endogenous variables, the estimator is inconsistent. However, I could not find 
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in the literature a way to test or correct for this. Honoré (1992) has developed a 
semiparametric estimator for fixed-effect tobit models. But, it relies on the assumption of 





I shall start the empirical analysis by testing for sample selection following Verbeek and 
Nijman (1992). One of the tests is to include variables measuring whether the household is 
observed in the previous wave, whether the household is observed in all waves included and 
the total number of waves the household is observed. According to the null hypothesis, these 
variables should not be significant in our model if there are no sample selection problems. 
Another test is Hausman-type and compares the fixed effects estimator of the unbalanced 
sample with the balanced sub-sample. 
 
Both tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of no sample selection (see Table 3). The 2χ -
statistic with one degree of freedom of the F-test for the three included variables are 2.20, 
1.88, and 0.21 respectively, which in all three cases is smaller than the 95% critical value. In 
the meanwhile, the reported value of the 2χ -statistic with twenty six degrees of freedom of 
the Hausman test is 24.05, which is also smaller than the 95% critical value. Therefore, any 
sample selection bias due to non-response and/or attrition can be ignored. 
 
The OLS and the random effects GLS results in the first two columns of Table 2 provide the 
benchmark for the rest of the study. There is a small but significant correlation between the 
predicted residuals of the GLS/RE estimation and some of the empirical model regressors, in 
particular the variables describing the immigrant household’s relatives living abroad. As 
discussed in the previous section, even in the presence of correlation between measured and 
latent effects, the LSDV estimation of the time varying variables is consistent. Therefore, it 
can be used in a Hausman specification test for the correlation between the included 
regressors and the latent heterogeneity. The 2χ -statistic with twenty seven degrees of 
freedom has the value of 37.23 and is smaller than the 95% critical value of 40.11. However, 
it is larger than the 90% level critical value of 36.70. The random effects model is slightly 
misspecified. 
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Accordingly, I shall proceed by estimating the remittance equation by using the Hausman and 
Taylor estimator with the household’s relatives living abroad variables treated as endogenous. 
The results are presented in the fourth column of the Table 4. The null hypothesis of 
consistent estimates now cannot be rejected; the 2χ  value of 10.83 being much smaller than 
the 90% level critical value. 
 
After controlling for endogeniety, the measured effect of the number of sons, daughters, 
grandsons and –daughters living abroad becomes nearly three times smaller and loses its 
significance. In the meantime, the effect of the number of brothers and sisters living abroad 
turns from positive into negative and significant at the 10% level. Finally, the coefficient of 
the log of GDP per capita in the home country becomes larger and significant at the 10% 
level and the only citizenship effects that remain significant are in the case of immigrants 
with foreign citizenship and dual citizenship originating from the Western Balkans. 
 
Next, I would like to discuss the results of the panel tobit model (columns five to eight in 
Table 4) in which the censored nature of the remittance act is taken into account. These 
results are compared with the Hausman and Taylor estimation, which treats for endogeneity. 
Most of the model coefficients are significant and confirm the empirical results of previous 
studies and the predictions of our theoretical model. 
 
The gender coefficient is negative and significant in both estimations, showing that 
households having a woman as head remit less compared to man-headed households, 
resembling the findings of Semyonov and Gorodzeisky (2005). The latter argue that this is 
due to the fact that migrant women have lower income. However, the present model controls 
for income and also for the households structure, another important factor of remittance 
behaviour if taking into account that when a household is separated children more often live 
with the mother. Still, after controlling for these factors, the estimation results suggest that 
the woman-headed households are about 5% less likely to remit and if remitting then about 
29% less compared to the man-headed ones. One possible reason could be that, if living 
separated and because of the still extant discrimination in employment, the spouse of a 
woman (i.e. a man) is less income dependent compared with the spouse of a man (i.e. a 
woman)17. 
 
                                                 
17 For the simplicity of the argument, we disregard same sex marriages which we assume to be an exception. 
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The remittance pattern of immigrants to Germany has an inverse U-shape over lifetime, 
reaching a maximum shortly above age 50. This is an age when one’s children reach maturity 
and get married. An event at which traditionally parents make also the largest bequests to the 
young couple, e.g. give them financial support to buy an own dwelling. Furthermore, the 
financial support of the parents (which we found to be very important for the households 
included) usually stops at this age, since they become old and pass away. 
 
The number of adults and children in the household have a both negative and significant 
effect. One more child (under age 16) in the household decreases the probability to remit by 
2.6% and the amount of remittances by 15.1%, while one more adult in the household 
decreases the probability to remit by 3.9% and the amount of remittances by 22.9%. On the 
one hand, the higher effect of the number of adults could be explained by the fact that, if a 
parent or parent-in-law of the household head is present, possible high elderly-care expenses 
now fall in Germany and are not remitted abroad. On the other hand, expenses for children 
over age 16 (here included in the adults group) might be higher than for those under age 16, 
due to higher schooling expenses (i.e. tuition fees). 
 
There is no significant effect for being divorced or living separated from the spouse. In the 
meanwhile, the number of sons, daughters, grandsons and –daughters (of both the household 
had and his/hers spouse) is positive and significant in the OLS, GLS/RE, and tobit/RE 
estimations but turns insignificant in the LSDV and HT/IV-RE estimations, perhaps because 
the immigrant households in the GSOEP are more likely to be permanent ones. Therefore, the 
minor sons and daughters are likely to live with their parents in Germany, while adult sons 
and daughters chose to live in the home country if performing there well and are, therefore, 
not dependent on remittances from their parents. 
 
One very robust finding is the effect of the number of parents and/or grandparents abroad. 
The coefficient is positive and significant in all estimations suggesting that the financial 
support of the elderly was the main reason for remittances abroad for the average immigrant 
household in Germany. One more parent or grandparent abroad increased the probability to 
remit by 3.7% and the amount remitted by 21.9%. It is not straightforward if these are done 
out of altruism or self-interest (i.e. future inheritance). More probably, as argued by Lucas 
and Stark (1985), the motivation is mixed. 
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As mentioned before, the number of brothers and sisters in the home country has a positive 
effect in the tobit/RE estimation but turns negative in the HV/IV-GLS estimation18. One more 
brother or sister living in the home country reduces the amount remitted by about 5%. This 
makes sense if one takes into account that the presence of brothers and/or sisters splits the 
responsibility for the financial support of the elderly (i.e. parents and grandparents) among 
more persons/households. Furthermore, when one has more brothers and sisters the chance to 
inherit is also lower and, therefore, remittances motivated by self-interest should be smaller 
as well. 
 
Finally, the number of other relatives in the home country has no effect on the remittance 
activity, implying that remittances to an extended family member is rather an exception for 
the average immigrant household in Germany. 
 
As predicted by a longstanding literature, a positive change in the income level of the 
relatives living in the home country has a negative effect on remittances. An one percent 
increase in the GDP per capita of the home country reduces the propensity to remit by 3.5% 
and the amount remitted by 20.7%. Similarly, remittances are positively affected by a 
positive change in the immigrant households’ net income. A 1% increase in income increases 
the probability of remitting by 12.1% and the amount of remittances with 71.7%19. 
 
In line with the results of Shamsuddin and DeVoretz (1998) there is a significant substitution 
effect between home ownership and remittances. The results suggest that the integration in 
the host country’s society has a negative effect on the remittance activity. The ownership of a 
dwelling in Germany decreases with 3% the probability of making remittances and with 
18.2% the amount remitted. Similarly, each additional year of residence in Germany reduces 
the probability to remit by 0.3% and the amount remitted by 1.7%. 
 
Conversely, the return intention has a positive and significant effect on the remittance activity, 
confirming the hypothesis and empirical findings of Glytsos (1997). According to him, 
temporary migrants remit more than permanent ones. The “return illusion” increases the 
                                                 
18 In both estimations the coefficient’s significance level is at 10%. 
19 The HT/IV-GLS estimation gives, however, a slope effect of 33.2% which we believe to be due to large 
proportions of zero remittances of households with lower incomes. Therefore, we regard the results of the 
tobit/RE estimation as appropriate. 
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probability to remit by 5.5% and the amount remitted by 32.7%. Furthermore, the effect is 
three times as large as that of the self-assessed attachment to the home country. 
 
A positive change in wealth and the difference in growth rates have a pretty small positive 
effect on the remittance activity (0.3% and 0.1% respectively on the probability to remit and 
1.8% and 0.7% respectively on the amount remitted), significant at a 10% level in the 
tobit/RE and insignificant in the HT/IV-GLS estimation. This is pointing to the fact that the 
remittances to persons abroad are made rather out of altruistic motives and/or there are other 
factors that are more important in the determination of remittances motivated by self-interest. 
 
One of these could be education. Contrarily to the results of Faini (2006) the education level 
has a positive effect on remittances, with immigrants with completed high-school being 2.3% 
and those with university studies even 3.2% more likely to remit compared to those with no 
high-school completed. Similarly, the effect on the amount remitted is +13.3% for the 
medium skilled and +19.0% for the high-skilled. On the one hand, in the classical remittance 
theory this effect would be interpreted as a confirmation of the implicit family loan agreement 
hypothesis, according to which remittances are assumed to be the repayment of an informal 
and implicit loan contracted by the migrant for investment in his/her education and migration 
costs20. On the other hand, following Vadean (2007) higher skilled migrants are also more 
likely to make investments in the home country, because of better business abilities. There is 
no information in the GSOEP on the amounts invested in the home country. However, such 
investments are argued to be accompanied by remittances to relatives which might be 
particularly trustworthy agents in maintaining the assets on the migrant’s behalf and/or 
administrating his/her business (Lucas and Stark, 1985). 
 
According to the theoretical model presented before, another factor affecting remittances 
motivated by self-interest is the citizenship status of the migrant. And I hypothesise that the 
holding of only foreign citizenship or only citizenship of the host country is associated with 
transaction costs (i.e. mobility restrictions and/or rights to buy real estate) that might reduce 
the motivation of doing investments in assets (e.g. real estate) and business in the home 
country. 
 
                                                 
20 For details see Straubhaar and Vadean (2006). 
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The citizenship effect is robust (i.e. significant both in the tobit/RE and HT/IV-GLS 
estimation) only in the case of immigrants from the Western Balkans. As expected, in the 
case of immigrants from EEA and Switzerland, the twelve new EU Member States and 
Turkey the citizenship effect is insignificant or not robust. This is due to the fact that in the 
process of economic integration between Germany and these countries, mobility restrictions 
were removed and real estate markets gradually opened. 
 
Surprisingly, the effect is insignificant in the case of immigrants from the CIS as well. 
However, this is presumably due to the composition of this immigrant group of resettles of 
German origin, whose assimilation and family reunification is highly promoted by the 
German immigration and naturalisation policy. With a return intention rate of only 5% they 
most probably save and invest in Germany. But even if they buy real estate in their home 
country they hardly have any relatives abroad to take care of their assets and, thus, would 
probably pay real estate agents for that (payments we do not have information about). Other 
reasons for the absence of a citizenship effect on the remittance activity of migrants from the 
CIS could be the real estate market openness in Russia and the Ukraine and/or the dominance 
of altruistic motives to remit. 
 
As predicted by the theoretical model, in the presence of real estate market restrictions in the 
home country with regard to foreigners, holding only the German citizenship has a small 
negative effect on the remittances activity while holding dual citizenship a positive effect. 
Giving up the citizenship of the home country caused immigrants from the Western Balkans 
to be 0.7% less likely to remit and remitting 4.2% lower amounts. The F-test shows, however, 
that the remittance behaviour of the immigrants holding foreign citizenship and those holding 
German citizenship is significantly similar ( 2χ -statistic: 0.69; p-value: 0.406). 
 
Conversely, immigrants holding dual citizenship were 21.8% more likely to remit and 
remitted about 130% more compared to those holding foreign citizenship and the hypothesis 
that the coefficients are similar is rejected at the 99% level ( 2χ -statistic: 7.46; p-value: 
0.006). Hence, as predicted, in the presence of real estate market restrictions in the home 
country, holding only foreign or only German citizenship is associated with transaction costs 
that negatively affect the remittance activity. Dual citizenship confers to migrants the best 
ability to engage transnationally and, thus, encourages remittances. 
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Moreover, it should be mentioned that the remittances observed here do not include 
repatriated savings and investments but only payments to the relatives, e.g. for the 
maintenance of the assets acquired and held in the home country. If taking into account also 
the remittances for the acquisition of assets, the citizenship effect would probably be much 
stronger. 
 
Finally, we have to rise the question of the direction of causality: does transnational 
investment in assets and/or business in the home country affect the decision of an immigrant 
to change his/her citizenship status or not? In order to tackle this problem, I would like to 
proceed by distinguishing between the citizenship effect before and after the change in 
citizenship status. In order to capture this effect, each immigrant group is split into five 
subgroups: 1) foreign citizenship – contains the observation of all households that keep their 
foreign citizenship in all panel waves; 2) German citizenship (before) – include all 
observations of the households that change their citizenship status to German citizenship in 
the years waiting for naturalisation in Germany (i.e. while still holding foreign citizenship); 3) 
German citizenship (after) – include all observations of the households that change their 
citizenship status to German citizenship after this event already occurred; 4) dual citizenship 
(before) – include all observations of the households that change their citizenship status to 
dual citizenship in the years waiting for naturalisation (i.e. while still holding foreign 
citizenship); 5) dual citizenship (after) – include all observations of the households that 
change their citizenship status to dual citizenship after they received German citizenship. 
 
I argue that if the remittance activity has an effect on the decision to change one’s citizenship 
status, then the coefficient of the “before” variable should be significantly similar to that of 
the “after” variable, because the remittance activity should not change after a change in the 
citizenship status. However, if the two coefficients are different, then the change in the 
remittance activity might be due to the change in the citizenship status. The results are given 
in Table 5. The OLS estimation results and the estimation results of most demographic 
controls are not presented, due to similarity to the results contained in Table 421. 
 
As expected from the results of the previous model and confirmed by the F-test ( 2χ -statistic: 
3.17; p-value: 0.074), the single significant outcome for a different remittance behaviour 
before and after a change in citizenship status occurs in the case of immigrants from the 
                                                 
21 All estimation results are available upon request. 
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Western Balkans. Before taking up German citizenship (and implicitly holding foreign 
citizenship), the remittance behaviour of these households was similar to those of immigrant 
households from the Western Balkans that did not change their citizenship status during the 
years observed ( 2χ -statistic: 0.02; p-value: 0.884). However, after holding dual citizenship, 
the probability to remit of those households increased by 19.8% and the amount remitted by 
about 116%, reconfirming that in the presence of real estate market restrictions in the home 




This paper examines the remittance behaviour of immigrants in the framework of the German 
immigration and naturalization policy by focusing on the effect of the changes in the 
citizenship status. 
 
The remittances to persons abroad are modelled in an utility maximization model. Following 
Lucas and Stark (1985), I argue that remittances to relatives living in the home country are 
made out of both altruism (i.e. the migrant derives utility from his/her relatives consumption) 
and self-interest (i.e. payments to the relatives for the maintenance of assets and/or 
administrating the business owned by the migrant in the home country). Moreover, I 
hypothesise that giving up the citizenship of the home country is associated with transaction 
costs (i.e. restrictions to the home country’s real estate market and/or visa requirements when 
travelling to the home country) that might reduce the motivation of doing investments in 
assets (e.g. real estate) and business in the country of origin. In this case, remittances to 
relatives motivated by self-interest might be reduced accordingly. 
 
Conversely, dual citizenship gives the migrant the best capacity to act transnationally, i.e. full 
access to the markets of both the host and home country and mobility between the two, status 
that could stimulate investments in the home country and the related remittances to relatives. 
 
The empirical results confirm the hypothesis that the citizenship status is an important factor 
for the determination of international household to household remittance flows if the country 
of origin restricts the acquisition of real estate by foreigners. Giving up the citizenship of the 
home country caused immigrants from the Western Balkans to be 0.7% less likely to remit 
and remitting 4.2% lower amounts compared to those holding foreign citizenship. Conversely, 
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immigrants holding dual citizenship were 21.8% more likely to remit and remitted about 
130% more. Moreover, by comparing the households’ remittance activity before and after the 
change in citizenship status, revealed that the change from foreign to dual citizenship 
increased the probability to remit by 19.8% and the amount remitted by about 116%. 
 
To conclude, in order to keep remittance inflows at higher levels, it seems to be an 
appropriate strategy for migrant sending countries to open up real estate markets to foreigners, 
at least in relation to countries that host large groups of its Diaspora. Alternatively, migrant 
sending countries might increase efforts to accede to bilateral agreements with the latter, for 
the mutual recognition of dual citizenship. On their part, industrial countries could 
incorporate in their development aid policies the recognition of dual citizenship, in order to 
promote circular migration, the transnational activity of migrants and remittances. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 1996-2005 
 
 EU15/EEA + CH(i) EU new(ii) Turkey Western Balkan(iii) CIS(iv) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Woman as HH head (prop.) 0.23 0.42 0.29 0.46 0.16 0.37 0.32 0.47 0.27 0.45 
Age 50.63 13.14 45.80 13.80 44.55 13.31 50.23 11.75 46.12 15.18 
Education: high school (prop.) 0.27 0.44 0.48 0.50 0.31 0.46 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 
Education: more than high school (prop.) 0.15 0.36 0.33 0.47 0.09 0.29 0.19 0.39 0.29 0.45 
Nr. of adults in HH 2.29 0.88 2.03 0.76 2.38 0.93 2.20 0.90 2.21 0.80 
Nr. of children (age <16) in HH 0.66 0.97 0.75 1.02 1.32 1.25 0.54 0.97 1.02 1.36 
Married (prop.) 0.78 0.41 0.69 0.46 0.88 0.33 0.74 0.44 0.82 0.38 
Spouse lives abroad (prop.) 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 
Nr. of children and grandchildren abroad 0.24 0.86 0.06 0.35 0.37 1.69 0.62 1.86 0.05 0.39 
Nr. of parents and grandparents abroad 0.68 0.91 0.64 0.97 0.67 0.96 0.55 0.82 0.15 0.51 
Nr. of brothers/sisters abroad 1.44 1.92 0.82 1.45 1.44 2.18 1.52 2.03 0.28 0.78 
Nr. of other relatives abroad 5.54 12.08 1.69 5.05 4.85 11.11 4.48 8.36 0.38 3.24 
Home ownership (prop.) 0.32 0.47 0.21 0.41 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.37 0.25 0.44 
HH yearly net income 21,248.91 15,162.24 19,532.24 14,025.73 18,543.59 12,697.70 18,425.42 12,422.19 18,311.35 11,378.53 
HH yearly gross income from assets 1,115.78 6,802.97 526.78 2,246.70 608.09 4,012.78 439.71 1,133.00 325.06 2,480.21 
GDP per capita in home country 22,216.05 4,693.74 9,240.89 2,536.98 6,074.12 248.69 6,302.85 2,181.33 5,701.83 1,923.71 
Years since immigration 30.80 9.34 15.84 7.54 26.36 7.59 27.65 8.85 10.88 5.14 
Return intention (prop.) 0.70 0.46 0.16 0.36 0.64 0.48 0.62 0.48 0.05 0.21 
Connected to country of origin(v) 3.28 1.07 2.87 0.97 3.13 1.03 3.13 0.91 2.56 1.15 
Foreign citizenship (prop.) 0.96 0.20 0.13 0.34 0.85 0.36 0.85 0.35 0.04 0.20 
German citizenship (prop.) 0.03 0.18 0.65 0.48 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.33 0.87 0.33 
Dual citizenship (prop.) 0.01 0.10 0.22 0.41 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.09 0.28 
Remittance active HH (prop.) 0.23 0.42 0.49 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.64 0.48 0.39 0.49 
Average amount remitted 217.77 1,193.67 180.17 572.64 300.55 1,248.63 579.18 1,638.27 107.54 489.40 
Average amount remitted (if remittances >0) 946.37 2,347.25 370.95 777.70 675.67 1,803.64 905.62 1,975.44 275.12 753.13 
Observations 2,464 1,363 2,392 1,401 1,535 
Nr. of Households 327 194 308 179 231 






(i)  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
the United Kingdom.  
(ii)  Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
(iii)  Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro.  
(iv)  Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. 
(v)  From 1 = “not at all” to 5 = “very strongly”. 





Table 2: Remittance Activity of Households in the Panel 
 
Number of years in panel  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total % 
Non-remitters 11 37 39 55 42 180 41 48 47 256 756 61% 
Remitters 1 12 20 22 22 87 19 43 33 221 480 39% 
Total 12 49 59 77 64 267 60 91 80 477 1236 100% 
             
Number of years in panel   Number of years with 
positive remittances 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total  
1 1 8 11 10 9 27 5 16 11 57 155  
2  4 6 7 8 29 3 5 6 36 104  
3   3 3 4 19 2 8 3 33 75  
4    2 1 3 3 6 4 22 41  
5     0 4 4 2 2 16 28  
6      5 2 3 1 16 27  
7       0 3 4 15 22  
8        0 1 9 10  
9         1 13 14  
10          4 4  
Total 1 12 20 22 22 87 19 43 33 221 480  
 





Table 3: Sample Selection Test 
 
Cond. Uncens. Prob. Uncens. Cond. Uncens. Prob. Uncens. 
Gender (female=1) -0.285 -0.282 -0.254 
 [0.104]*** [0.229] [0.295] 
Age 0.092 0.096 0.099 
 [0.019]*** [0.035]*** [0.047]** 
Age squared x 100 -0.091 -0.094 -0.096 
 [0.019]*** [0.030]*** [0.040]** 
Education level: high school 0.192 0.183 0.111 
 [0.077]** [0.103]* [0.134] 
Education level: more than high school 0.271 0.206 0.041 
 [0.105]*** [0.156] [0.206] 
Number of Adults in HH (age >16) -0.140 -0.048 -0.055 
 [0.042]*** [0.053] [0.071] 
Number of Children in HH (age <16) -0.123 -0.031 -0.039 
 [0.035]*** [0.051] [0.069] 
Spouse and/or Ex-Spouse Abroad -0.189 -0.357 -0.255 
 [0.182] [0.247] [0.285] 
Nr. of Sons, Daughters/ Grandsons, -daughters Abroad 0.171 0.043 0.101 
 [0.030]*** [0.047] [0.060]* 
Nr. of Parents/Grandparents Abroad 0.201 0.149 0.151 
 [0.046]*** [0.066]** [0.080]* 
Nr. of Brothers/Sisters Abroad 0.016 -0.048 -0.053 
 [0.021] [0.030] [0.036] 
Nr. of Other Relatives Abroad -0.001 -0.007 -0.003 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] 
Home Ownership -0.149 -0.270 -0.270 
 [0.086]* [0.114]** [0.149]* 
Log of Income from Assets 0.014 0.008 0.007 
 [0.011] [0.012] [0.017] 
Log of Net Income 0.384 0.271 0.457 
 [0.061]*** [0.069]*** [0.127]*** 
Difference Growth Rates: DE – Home Country 0.008 0.005 0.007 
 [0.004]* [0.004] [0.005] 
Log of GDP per Capita (PPP) in Home Country -0.173 -0.204 -0.533 
 [0.136] [0.212] [0.281]* 





Cond. Uncens. Cond. Uncens. Prob. Uncens. Cond. Uncens. 
Years Since Immigration -0.012 -0.063 -0.065 
 [0.007]* [0.024]*** [0.030]** 
Return Home Intended 0.281   
 [0.110]**   
Connected to Country of Origin 0.135   
 [0.044]***   
Turkish immigrant: German citizenship -0.114   
 [0.176]   
Turkish immigrant: dual citizenship 0.064   
 [0.411]   
Immigrant from the Western Balkans: foreign citizenship 0.532   
 [0.159]***   
Immigrant from the Western Balkans: German citizenship 0.277   
 [0.309]   
Immigrant from the Western Balkans: dual citizenship 2.161   
 [0.512]***   
Immigrant from the CIS: foreign citizenship -0.130   
 [0.437]   
Immigrant from the CIS: German citizenship -0.100   
 [0.198]   
Immigrant from the CIS: dual citizenship 0.219   
 [0.311]   
Immigrant from a EU new Member State: foreign citizenship -0.208   
 [0.305]   
Immigrant from a EU new Member State: German citizenship 0.180   
 [0.196]   
Immigrant from a EU new Member State: dual citizenship 0.339   
 [0.245]   
Immigrant from EEA+CH: foreign citizenship -0.465   
 [0.216]**   
Immigrant from EEA+CH: German citizenship -0.294   
 [0.432]   
Immigrant from EEA+CH: dual citizenship -0.307   
 [0.655]   
Household present in the last wave (s_i,t-1) 0.147   
 [0.099]   






Cond. Uncens. Cond. Uncens. Prob. Uncens. Cond. Uncens. 
Household observed in all panel waves (Prod(S_ir)) 0.211   
 [0.154]   
Number of waves in the panel (T_i) -0.015   
 [0.032]   
Constant -3.184 -0.651 0.847 
 [1.344]** [2.127] [2.984] 
Observations 9,155 9,155 4,770 
Number of Households 1,236 1,236 477 
Wald chi-squared/ R-squared 375.92 0.01 0.02 
F-test of significance (p-value):    
 Household present in the last wave (s_i,t-1) 2.20 (0.138)   
 Household observed in all panel waves (Prod(S_ir)) 1.88 (0.170)   
 Number of waves in the panel (T_i) 0.21 (0.643)   
Hausman test: chi-squared (p-value)  24.05 (0.573) 
Standard errors in brackets    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    





Table 4: Estimation Results of Log of Remittances Abroad 
 
     Marginal Effects after Tobit/RE 





Gender (female=1) -0.322 -0.280 -0.270 -0.287 -1.388 -0.250 -0.291 -0.049 
 [0.060]*** [0.104]*** [0.211] [0.124]** [0.365]*** [0.062]*** [0.074]*** [0.012]*** 
Age 0.083 0.095 0.097 0.108 0.574 0.111 0.124 0.021 
 [0.012]*** [0.019]*** [0.033]*** [0.022]*** [0.080]*** [0.016]*** [0.017]*** [0.003]*** 
Age squared x 100 -0.083 -0.094 -0.095 -0.104 -0.560 -0.108 -0.121 -0.020 
 [0.012]*** [0.019]*** [0.028]*** [0.022]*** [0.080]*** [0.016]*** [0.017]*** [0.003]*** 
Education level: high school 0.147 0.197 0.196 0.205 0.615 0.121 0.133 0.023 
 [0.062]** [0.076]** [0.095]** [0.082]** [0.307]** [0.062]* [0.067]** [0.011]** 
Education level: more than high school 0.287 0.282 0.232 0.283 0.864 0.175 0.190 0.032 
 [0.077]*** [0.105]*** [0.143] [0.116]** [0.386]** [0.083]** [0.087]** [0.015]** 
Number of Adults in HH (age >16) -0.238 -0.140 -0.050 -0.117 -1.065 -0.205 -0.229 -0.039 
 [0.039]*** [0.042]*** [0.049] [0.045]*** [0.184]*** [0.036]*** [0.039]*** [0.007]*** 
Number of Children in HH (age <16) -0.161 -0.118 -0.032 -0.101 -0.701 -0.135 -0.151 -0.026 
 [0.025]*** [0.035]*** [0.047] [0.039]*** [0.136]*** [0.026]*** [0.029]*** [0.005]*** 
Spouse and/or Ex-Spouse Abroad -0.067 -0.181 -0.359 -0.384 -0.060 -0.012 -0.013 -0.002 
 [0.151] [0.182] [0.230] [0.238] [0.676] [0.130] [0.146] [0.025] 
Nr. of Sons, Daughters/ Grandsons, -daughters Abroad 0.231 0.168 0.042 0.053 0.570 0.110 0.123 0.021 
 [0.034]*** [0.030]*** [0.044] [0.046] [0.091]*** [0.018]*** [0.020]*** [0.003]*** 
Nr. of Parents/Grandparents Abroad 0.248 0.208 0.149 0.168 1.016 0.196 0.219 0.037 
 [0.035]*** [0.045]*** [0.062]** [0.063]*** [0.163]*** [0.032]*** [0.035]*** [0.006]*** 
Nr. of Brothers/Sisters Abroad 0.052 0.016 -0.048 -0.050 0.127 0.024 0.027 0.005 
 [0.016]*** [0.021] [0.027]* [0.028]* [0.074]* [0.014]* [0.016]* [0.003]* 
Nr. of Other Relatives Abroad 0.005 -0.001 -0.007 -0.007 0.013 0.003 0.003 0.001 
 [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]* [0.004] [0.013] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] 
Home Ownership -0.080 -0.148 -0.266 -0.180 -0.859 -0.159 -0.182 -0.030 
 [0.066] [0.086]* [0.106]** [0.093]* [0.344]** [0.061]*** [0.071]** [0.012]** 
Log of Income from Assets 0.016 0.014 0.008 0.012 0.083 0.016 0.018 0.003 
 [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.050]* [0.010]* [0.011]* [0.002]* 
Log of Net Income 0.554 0.390 0.267 0.332 3.329 0.642 0.717 0.121 
 [0.063]*** [0.061]*** [0.062]*** [0.063]*** [0.351]*** [0.069]*** [0.075]*** [0.013]*** 
Difference Growth Rates: DE – Home Country 0.015 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.031 0.006 0.007 0.001 
 [0.006]** [0.004]* [0.004] [0.004] [0.017]* [0.003]* [0.004]* [0.001]* 






     Marginal Effects after Tobit/RE 





Log of GDP per Capita (PPP) in Home Country -0.127 -0.177 -0.192 -0.278 -0.962 -0.186 -0.207 -0.035 
 [0.095] [0.136] [0.195] [0.169]* [0.481]** [0.093]** [0.104]** [0.018]** 
Years Since Immigration -0.008 -0.011 -0.056 -0.016 -0.079 -0.015 -0.017 -0.003 
 [0.00374]** [0.007]* [0.019]*** [0.008]** [0.022]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.001]*** 
Return Home Intended 0.268 0.300  0.367 1.514 0.294 0.327 0.055 
 [0.062]*** [0.109]***  [0.140]*** [0.345]*** [0.068]*** [0.075]*** [0.013]*** 
Connected to Country of Origin 0.125 0.132  0.142 0.480 0.093 0.103 0.018 
 [0.025]*** [0.044]***  [0.056]** [0.133]*** [0.026]*** [0.029]*** [0.005]*** 
Turkish immigrant: German citizenship 0.305 -0.113  -0.212 0.599 0.122 0.132 0.023 
 [0.154]** [0.176]  [0.184] [0.694] [0.148] [0.156] [0.027] 
Turkish immigrant: dual citizenship 0.322 0.042  -0.101 1.698 0.383 0.391 0.068 
 [0.396] [0.411]  [0.424] [1.557] [0.404] [0.383] [0.067] 
Immigrant from the Western Balkans: foreign citizenship 0.614 0.532  0.557 1.395 0.296 0.313 0.054 
 [0.107]*** [0.159]***  [0.202]*** [0.459]*** [0.106]*** [0.107]*** [0.019]*** 
Immigrant from the Western Balkans: German citizenship 0.472 0.282  0.268 1.201 0.258 0.271 0.047 
 [0.218]** [0.309]  [0.360] [1.003] [0.238] [0.237] [0.041] 
Immigrant from the Western Balkans: dual citizenship 2.689 2.174  1.984 5.861 1.875 1.609 0.272 
 [0.564]*** [0.512]***  [0.541]*** [1.593]*** [0.736]** [0.546]*** [0.084]*** 
Immigrant from the CIS: foreign citizenship 0.205 -0.173  -0.403 -0.678 -0.123 -0.142 -0.024 
 [0.324] [0.436]  [0.506] [1.550] [0.263] [0.317] [0.052] 
Immigrant from the CIS: German citizenship 0.070 -0.104  -0.310 -0.508 -0.095 -0.108 -0.018 
 [0.116] [0.198]  [0.251] [0.647] [0.117] [0.135] [0.023] 
Immigrant from the CIS: dual citizenship 0.522 0.192  -0.078 1.657 0.371 0.381 0.066 
 [0.247]** [0.310]  [0.355] [1.119] [0.287] [0.274] [0.048] 
Immigrant from a EU new Member State: foreign citizenship -0.308 -0.233  -0.173 -1.454 -0.245 -0.296 -0.049 
 [0.196] [0.304]  [0.364] [1.035] [0.152] [0.200] [0.032] 
Immigrant from a EU new Member state: German citizenship 0.321 0.190  0.131 0.658 0.133 0.145 0.025 
 [0.121]*** [0.195]  [0.243] [0.633] [0.134] [0.142] [0.024] 
Immigrant from a EU new Member state: dual citizenship 0.623 0.342  0.282 1.906 0.434 0.441 0.076 
 [0.183]*** [0.245]  [0.290] [0.797]** [0.210]** [0.197]** [0.035]** 
Immigrant from EEA+CH: foreign citizenship -0.497 -0.471  -0.326 -3.006 -0.508 -0.613 -0.100 
 [0.142]*** [0.215]**  [0.269] [0.734]*** [0.109]*** [0.142]*** [0.022]*** 
Immigrant from EEA+CH: German citizenship -0.242 -0.296  -0.219 -2.124 -0.335 -0.422 -0.068 
 [0.250] [0.432]  [0.485] [1.974] [0.249] [0.361] [0.054] 
Immigrant from EEA+CH: dual citizenship -0.319 -0.279  -0.169 -0.601 -0.110 -0.126 -0.021 






      Marginal Effects after Tobit/RE 









 [0.457] [0.654]  [0.707] [2.602] [0.447] [0.534] [0.088] 
Constant -4.889 -3.370 -0.239 -2.149 -40.676    
 [0.967]*** [1.330]** [0.089]*** [1.676] [5.253]***    
Observations 9,155 9,155 9,155 9,155 9,155    
Number of Households  1,236 1,236 1,236 1,236    
Left censored observations (=0)     7,704    
R-squared / Wald chi-sqared 0.11 370.82 118.92 245.59 566.12    
rho  0.33  0.49 0.27    
Hausman specif. test: chi-squared (p-value)  37.23 (0.091) 10.83 (0.998)     
Standard errors in brackets (robust for OLS)         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         
Variables in bold face are treated as endogenous in HT/IV-
GLS       
 





Table 5: Estimation Rresults of Log of Remittances Abroad (Citizenship Effect Before and After Change in Citizenship Status) 
 
     Marginal Effects after Tobit/RE 





Gender (female=1) -0.265 -0.270 -0.273 -1.277 -0.230 -0.267 -0.045 
 [0.105]** [0.21096] [0.12847]** [0.37096]*** [0.06294]*** [0.07553]*** [0.01237]***
Age 0.097 0.097 0.110 0.606 0.116 0.130 0.022 
 [0.019]*** [0.03298]*** [0.02264]*** [0.08076]*** [0.01595]*** [0.01732]*** [0.00292]***
Age squared x 100 -0.095 -0.095 -0.105 -0.590 -0.113 -0.127 -0.021 
 [0.019]*** [0.028]*** [0.022]*** [0.081]*** [0.016]*** [0.017]*** [0.003]*** 
        
        
Return Home Intended 0.312  0.387 1.620 0.313 0.349 0.059 
 [0.111]***  [0.149]*** [0.353]*** [0.069]*** [0.076]*** [0.013]*** 
Connected to Country of Origin 0.133  0.141 0.487 0.093 0.105 0.018 
 [0.044]***  [0.059]** [0.133]*** [0.026]*** [0.029]*** [0.005]*** 
Turkish immigrant: German citizenship - before  0.351  0.405 1.758 0.394 0.404 0.070 
 [0.269]  [0.341] [0.862]** [0.223]* [0.212]* [0.037]* 
Turkish immigrant: German citizenship - after 0.109  0.116 0.877 0.181 0.194 0.033 
 [0.252]  [0.328] [0.795] [0.177] [0.182] [0.032] 
Turkish immigrant: dual citizenship - before 0.594  0.645 3.050 0.771 0.741 0.129 
 [0.559]  [0.670] [1.832]* [0.586] [0.501] [0.087] 
Turkish immigrant: dual citizenship - after 0.210  0.123 2.344 0.555 0.552 0.096 
 [0.433]  [0.571] [1.223]* [0.349] [0.315]* [0.055]* 
Immigrant from the Western Balkans: foreign citizenship 0.601  0.633 1.623 0.349 0.366 0.063 
 [0.170]***  [0.226]*** [0.481]*** [0.115]*** [0.113]*** [0.020]*** 
Immigrant from the Western Balkans: German citizenship - before 0.361  0.572 0.787 0.162 0.174 0.030 
 [0.583]  [0.663] [2.063] [0.456] [0.471] [0.082] 
Immigrant from the Western Balkans: German citizenship - after 0.278  0.301 1.313 0.283 0.297 0.051 
 [0.352]  [0.457] [1.061] [0.255] [0.252] [0.044] 
Immigrant from the Western Balkans: dual citizenship - before 0.623  0.752 0.996 0.209 0.222 0.038 
 [0.648]  [0.805] [2.001] [0.459] [0.465] [0.081] 
Immigrant from the Western Balkans: dual citizenship - after 1.861  1.795 5.186 1.564 1.378 0.236 
 [0.580]***  [0.750]** [1.520]*** [0.645]** [0.492]*** [0.079]*** 
Immigrant from the CIS: foreign citizenship 0.137  0.042 0.326 0.064 0.071 0.012 
 [0.544]  [0.710] [1.697] [0.345] [0.374] [0.064] 






     Marginal Effects after Tobit/RE 






Immigrant from the CIS: German citizenship - before -0.447  -0.654 -3.436 -0.473 -0.647 -0.100 
 [0.671]  [0.696] [3.929] [0.363] [0.647] [0.086] 
Immigrant from the CIS: German citizenship - after -0.010  -0.208 -0.021 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 
 [0.209]  [0.277] [0.671] [0.128] [0.144] [0.024] 
Immigrant from the CIS: dual citizenship - before 
(dropped due to 
collinearity)      
        
Immigrant from the CIS: dual citizenship - after 0.007  -0.213 0.346 0.068 0.075 0.013 
 [0.307]  [0.406] [0.997] [0.203] [0.220] [0.038] 
Immigrant from a EU new Member State: foreign citizenship -0.206  -0.086 -2.085 -0.329 -0.414 -0.067 
 [0.349]  [0.454] [1.174]* [0.150]** [0.216]* [0.033]** 
Immigrant from a EU new Member State: German citizenship - before -0.161  -0.278 2.279 0.538 0.536 0.093 
 [0.652]  [0.689] [2.172] [0.617] [0.559] [0.098] 
Immigrant from a EU new Member State: German citizenship - after 0.139  0.070 0.356 0.070 0.077 0.013 
 [0.220]  [0.289] [0.699] [0.142] [0.154] [0.026] 
Immigrant from a EU new Member State: dual citizenship - before 0.252  0.397 0.222 0.043 0.048 0.008 
 [0.949]  [1.000] [4.538] [0.906] [0.992] [0.169] 
Immigrant from a EU new Member State: dual citizenship - after 0.583  0.588 2.657 0.635 0.629 0.109 
 [0.250]**  [0.331]* [0.734]*** [0.212]*** [0.190]*** [0.033]*** 
Immigrant from EEA+CH: foreign citizenship -0.394  -0.240 -2.613 -0.444 -0.534 -0.088 
 [0.222]*  [0.285] [0.749]*** [0.113]*** [0.146]*** [0.023]*** 
Immigrant from EEA+CH: German citizenship - before -0.541  -0.300 -6.762 -0.686 -1.136 -0.154 
 [0.508]  [0.634] [2.954]** [0.122]*** [0.384]*** [0.034]*** 
Immigrant from EEA+CH: German citizenship - after -0.336  -0.249 -1.762 -0.286 -0.354 -0.057 
 [0.520]  [0.650] [2.047] [0.277] [0.384] [0.059] 
Immigrant from EEA+CH: dual citizenship - before -0.504  -0.395 -1.709 -0.278 -0.343 -0.056 
 [1.060]  [1.229] [4.103] [0.558] [0.771] [0.119] 
Immigrant from EEA+CH: dual citizenship - after -0.142  0.010 -1.148 -0.197 -0.236 -0.039 
 [0.701]  [0.924] [2.504] [0.383] [0.492] [0.079] 
Constant -3.426 -0.239 -2.264 -41.217    
 [1.343]** [0.089]*** [1.712] [5.301]***    






     Marginal Effects after Tobit/RE 





Observations 9,155 9,155 9,155 9,155    
Number of Households 1,236 1,236 1,236 1,236    
Left censored observations (=0)    7,704    
R-squared / Wald chi-sqared 368.72 118.92 234.96 577.19    
rho 0.34  0.52 0.27    
Hausman specif. test: chi-squared (p-value) 39.59 (0.056) 13.76 (0.983)     
 
Standard errors in brackets (robust for OLS)        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
Variables in bold face are treated as endogenous in HT/IV-GLS        
 
 
